Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games by Hilbe, C. et al.
Evolution of extortion in Iterated 
Prisoner's Dilemma games
Hilbe, C., Nowak, M.A. and Sigmund, K.
IIASA Interim Report
2013
 
Hilbe, C., Nowak, M.A. and Sigmund, K. (2013) Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. IIASA Interim 
Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, IR-13-038 Copyright © 2013 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/10725/
Interim Reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis 
Schlossplatz 1 
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
Tel: +43 2236 807 342
Fax: +43 2236 71313
E-mail: publications@iiasa.ac.at
Web: www.iiasa.ac.at
Interim Reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only
limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the
Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work. 
Interim Report IR-13-038
Evolution of extortion in iterated prisoner’s dilemma games 
Christian Hilbe 
Martin A. Nowak 
Karl Sigmund (ksigmund@iiasa.ac.at) 
Approved by 
Ulf Dieckmann 
Director, Evolution and Ecology Program 
June 2015 
The Evolution of Extortion
in Iterated Prisoners Dilemma Games
Christian Hilbe1, Martin A. Nowak 2, & Karl Sigmund 3,4
1 Max Planck Institut for Evolutionary Biology, Ploen
2 Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University,
One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
3 Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
4 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
February 18, 2013
Keywords: evolutionary game theory; iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma; coopera-
tion; host-endosymbiont interactions,
Corresponding author:
Karl Sigmund
Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
e-mail: karl.sigmund@univie.ac.at, phone: +43 (0)1 4277 506 12, fax: +43 (0)1 4277 9
506
1
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolution-
ary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeat-
edly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the
outcome of previous interactions, thus allowing for reciprocation. Recently a
new class of strategies has been proposed, so called ‘zero determinant strate-
gies’. These strategies enforce a fixed linear relationship between one’s own
payoff and that of the other player. A subset of those strategies allows ‘ex-
tortioners’ to ensure that any increase in the own payoff exceeds that of the
other player by a fixed percentage. Here we analyze the evolutionary per-
formance of this new class of strategies. We show that in reasonably large
populations they can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar
to tit-for-tat, but that they are not the stable outcome of natural selection. In
very small populations, however, extortioners hold their ground. Extortion
strategies can also do well in co-evolutionary arms races between two distinct
populations: significantly, they benefit the population which evolves at the
slower rate - an instance of the so-called Red King effect. This may affect the
evolution of interactions between host species and their endosymbionts.
Introduction
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) has a long history as a model for the
cultural and biological evolution of cooperation (1–13). A new class of so called
zero-determinant (ZD) strategies has recently attracted considerable attention (14–
16). Such strategies allow players to unilaterally enforce a linear relation between
the own and the co-player’s payoff. A subset consists of the so-called equalizer
strategies: these assign to the co-player’s score a predetermined value, indepen-
dent of the co-player’s strategy, see also (17). Another subset consists of the
extortion strategies: they guarantee that the own surplus exceeds the co-player’s
surplus by a ﬁxed percentage. Press and Dyson (14) have explored the power of
ZD-strategies to manipulate any ’evolutionary’ opponent, i.e., any co-player able
to learn, and to adapt.
In their commentary to Press and Dyson, Stewart and Plotkin (15) ask: ’What
does the existence of ZD strategies mean for evolutionary game theory: can such
strategies naturally arise by mutation, invade, and remain dominant in evolving
populations?’ In evolutionary game theory, it is the population that adapts: more
and more players switch to the more successful strategies. From the outset, it may
seem that the opportunities for extortion strategies are limited. If a strategy is suc-
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cessful, it will spread, and therefore be more likely to be matched against its like:
but any two extortioners hold each other down to surplus zero. In a homogeneous
population of extortioners, it is thus better to deviate and to cooperate. Extortion is
therefore evolutionarily unstable (16). However, we shall see that if the two play-
ers engaged in an IPD belong to distinct populations, the evolutionary prospects
of extortion improve signiﬁcantly. Moreover, extortioners can do well even in a
single population, if its size is very small.
In the following, we investigate the impact of ZD-strategies on evolutionary
game theory. We show that in large well-mixed populations, extortion strategies
can play an important role, but only as catalyzers for cooperation, not as a long-
term outcome. However, if the IPD is played between members of two separate
populations evolving on different time-scales, extortion strategies can get the up-
per hand in whichever population evolves more slowly, and enable it to enslave
the other population, an interesting example of the so-called Red-King effect (18).
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game is a game between two players I and II
having two strategies each, which we denote by C (’to cooperate’) and D (’to
defect’). It is assumed that the payoff for two cooperating players, R, is larger
than the payoff for two defecting players, P . If one player cooperates and the
other defects, the defector’s payoff T is larger than R, and the cooperator’s payoff
S smaller than P . Thus the game is deﬁned by T > R > P > S. An important
special case is the so-called donation game, where each player can ’cooperate’
(play C) by providing a beneﬁt b to the other player at own cost c, with 0 < c < b.
Then T = b, R = b− c, P = 0 and S = −c.
In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game (IPD), the two players are required
to play an inﬁnite number of rounds, and their payoffs PI resp. PII are given by
the limit in the mean of the payoffs per round. An important class of strategies
consists of so-called memory-one strategies. They are given by the conditional
probabilities pR, pS, pT and pP to play C after experiencing outcomeR, S, T resp.
P in the previous round. (In addition, such a strategy has to specify the move in
the ﬁrst round, but this has only a transient effect and plays no role in the long run
(19)). An important class of memory-one strategies consists of reactive strategies,
which only depend on the co-player’s move in the previous round (not the own).
Then pR = pT =: p and pP = pS =: q, so that a reactive strategy corresponds to
a point (p, q) in the unit square (20).
We will ﬁrst deﬁne and characterize zero-determinant strategies, equalizers
and extortioners. We then investigate, in the context of evolutionary game the-
ory, the contest between extortioners and four of the most important memory-one
strategies. We will show that extortion cannot be an outcome of evolution, but
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can catalyze the emergence of cooperation. The same result will then be obtained
if we consider all memory-one strategies: in particular, extortion strategies can
only get a foothold if the population is very small. If the IPD is played between
members of two distinct populations, ZD-strategies can emerge in the popula-
tion which evolves more slowly. In particular, extortion strategies can allow host
species to enslave their endosymbionts.
Methods and Results
Definitions. Press and Dyson (14) deﬁne the class of ’zero-determinant’ strategies
ZD as those memory-one strategies (pR, pT , pS, pP ) satisfying, for some reals
α, β, γ, the equations
pR − 1 = αR + βR + γ [1a]
pS − 1 = αS + βT + γ [1b]
pT = αT + βS + γ [1c]
pP = αP + βP + γ. [1d]
(We note that 1−pR and 1−pS are the probabilities to switch from C toD, while
pT and pP are the probabilities to switch from D to C.) Press and Dyson showed
that if player I uses such a ZD strategy, then
αPI + βPII + γ = 0, [2]
no matter which strategy player II is using. Equalizer strategies are those ZD
strategies for which α = 0 = β: then
PII = −γ/β. [3]
Thus player I can assign to the co-player any payoff between P and R. (Indeed,
since the pi have to be between 0 and 1, it follows that β < 0 and P ≤ PII ≤ R).
The so-called χ-extortion strategies are those ZD-strategies for which γ = −(α+
β)P , with χ := −β/α > 1. Then
PI − P = χ(PII − P ).
In this case, player I can guarantee that the own ’surplus’ (over the maximin
value P ) is the χ-fold of the co-player’s surplus. Fig. 1 shows examples of these
different ZD-strategies.
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Press and Dyson speak of zero-determinant strategies because they use for
their proof of [2] an ingenious method based on determinants. In Appendix A,
we present a more elementary proof, following (17). Within the four-dimensional
unit cube of all memory-one strategies (pR, pS, pT , pP ), the ZD strategies form
a three-dimensional subset ZD containing the two-dimensional subsets EQ and
EX of equalizers resp. extortioners (see Appendix B). In Fig. 2 we sketch these
sets for the reactive strategies.
Extortion within one population. In order to investigate the role of extortion
in the context of evolutionary games, we concentrate on the donation game (in
the SI we provide further results for the general IPD, which show that the main
conclusions are independent of special characteristics of the donation game). We
ﬁrst consider how a χ-extortion strategy Eχ fares against some of the most impor-
tant memory-one strategies, namely TFT = (1, 0, 1, 0), AllD = (0, 0, 0, 0), AllC
= (1, 1, 1, 1) and the Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy WSLS which is encoded by
(1, 0, 0, 1), and hence cooperates if and only if the co-player’s move, in the pre-
vious round, was the same as the own move, see (11). We note that TFT is a
ZD-strategy and can be viewed as a limiting case of an extortion strategy, with
χ = 1. For the donation game, the payoff for a player using strategy i against a
player with strategy j is given by the (i, j)-th element of the following matrix:
TFT WSLS Eχ All C All D
TFT (b− c)/2 (b− c)/2 0 b− c 0
WSLS (b− c)/2 b− c b
2
−c2
b(1+2χ)+c(2+χ)
(2b− c)/2 −c/2
Eχ 0
(b2−c2)χ
b(1+2χ)+c(2+χ)
0 (b
2
−c2)χ
bχ+c
0
All C b− c (b− 2c)/2 b
2
−c2
bχ+c
b− c −c
All D 0 b/2 0 b 0
[4]
Let us start with the pairwise comparisons. Eχ is neutral with respect to
AllD. It is weakly dominated by TFT (in the sense that a TFT -player does
not fare better than an extortioner against extortioners, but that interactions with
other TFT -players are giving an advantage to TFT .) AllC players can invade
extortioners, and vice versa: these two strategies can stably coexist in propor-
tions c(χ − 1) : (b + c). Finally, WSLS dominates extortioners (in the sense
that WSLS provides a better response that extortion against itself and against
extortioners). We note that the mixed equilibrium of extortioners and uncondi-
tional cooperators can be invaded by each of the other three strategies. The same
holds for the mixed equilibria of extortioners and unconditional defectors, if the
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frequency of extortioners is sufﬁciently high. In particular, TFT can always in-
vade such a mixed equilibrium, but can, in turn, be invaded by WSLS or AllC.
No Nash equilibrium involves Eχ. If b < 2c, there are two Nash equilibria: a
mixture of TFT , AllC and AllD and a mixture of WSLS, AllC and AllD. If
b > 2c, there exist four Nash equilibria. In particular,WSLS is then a strict Nash
equilibrium.
The replicator dynamics (19, 21, 22) displays for the payoff matrix contin-
uous families of ﬁxed points and periodic orbits, and hence is far from being
robust. The same applies to most other deterministic game dynamics. It seems
more reliable to consider a stochastic process which describes a ﬁnite, well-mixed
population consisting ofM players, and evolving via copying of successful strate-
gies and exploration, i.e., by a selection-mutation process (22, 23, 26). Selection
is here viewed as an imitation process; in each time step, two randomly chosen
players A and B compare their average payoffs PA and PB, and A switches to
B’s strategy with a probability given by (1 + exp[s(PA − PB)])
−1, where s ≥ 0
corresponds to ’selection strength’. (As shown in the SI, the details of the imita-
tion process matter little.) Additionally, mutations occur with a small probability
µ > 0 (corresponding to the adoption of another strategy, each alternative being
equally likely).
Any such stochastic process yields a steady state distribution of strategies. We
ﬁnd that while extortioners are never the most abundant strategy, they can play the
role of a catalyzer. Indeed, if only AllD and WSLS are available, a population
may be trapped in a non-cooperative state for a considerable time, leading to a
mutation-selection equilibrium that clearly favors defectors (see Fig. 3A). In such
a case, extortioners (Fig. 3B) and TFT (Fig. 3C. and (10)) offer an escape: both
strategies can subvert an AllD population through neutral drift. Once defectors
are rare, WSLS outperforms TFT , and it also prevails against extortioners if
the population is sufﬁciently large (in a direct competition,WSLS always gets a
higher payoff than Eχ ifM > 1+χ). Thus, in large populations, extortioners and
TFT -players tip the mutation-selection balance towards WSLS, and therefore
increase the level of cooperation. Further expansion of the strategy space through
adding AllC has only a small effect on the steady state (Figs. 3D and 3E), slightly
favoring extortioners.
What happens when players are not restricted to the ﬁve speciﬁc strategies
considered so far, but can choose among all possible memory-one strategies? We
study this by using the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of (25), assuming that
mutants can pick up any memory-one strategy, with a uniform probability dis-
tribution on the four dimensional unit cube; we further assume that the mutant
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reaches ﬁxation, or is eliminated, before the next mutation occurs. Overall, this
stochastic process leads to a sequence of monomorphic populations. The evolu-
tionary importance of a given strategy can then be assessed by computing how
often the state of the population is in its neighborhood. For a subset A of the
set of memory-one strategies, we denote the δ-neighborhood of A (with respect
to Euclidean distance) by Aδ, and let µ(Aδ) denote the fraction of time that the
evolving population visits Aδ. We say that Aδ is favored by evolution if the evo-
lutionary process visits Aδ more often than expected under neutral evolution, i.e.,
if µ(Aδ) is larger than the volume of the intersection of Aδ with the unit cube of
all memory-one strategies. We apply this concept to A = ZD, EQ, EX .
Extensive simulations indicate that neither extortioners, nor equalizers or
zero-determinant strategies, are favored by evolution if the population is reason-
ably large (see Fig. 4A). By contrast, very small population sizes promote the
evolution of these behaviors. For extortioners, this result is intuitive: in small
populations, the fact that self-interactions are excluded yields greater weight to
interactions with players using the rival strategy, rather than with players using the
own strategy (23); this effect may even result in the evolution of spite (28, 29). We
address this point in more detail in the SI (section 2). Essentially, both extortioners
and equalizers suffer from not achieving maximal payoff b−c against themselves,
which causes their inherent instability, as also stressed in (12). The same holds for
most ZD-strategies. By contrast, WSLS players do well against their like, and
therefore stably dominate the evolutionary dynamics for larger population sizes,
at least when b > 2c or, for more general PD games, when 2R > T + P (see
Fig. 4B and (19)). As a (possibly surprising) consequence, larger populations also
yield higher average payoffs (Fig. 4C). In the SI, we show that these qualitative
results are robust with respect to changes in parameter values, such as beneﬁts and
costs, or the strength of selection. Hence extortion is disfavored by evolution as
soon as the population size exceeds a critical level.
Extortion between two populations. Let us now consider two species (for
instance, hosts and their symbionts), or two classes of a single species, old and
young, for example, buyers and sellers, or rulers and subjects, engaged in an
IPD game which, of course, is now unlikely to be symmetric. In such situ-
ations, extortioners may evolve even in large populations. Indeed, extortioners
provide incentives to cooperate: as shown by Press and Dyson (14), AllC is al-
ways a best response to an extortion strategy. In a single population of homoge-
neous players, this is not turned to advantage, as the extortioners’ success leads to
more interactions with their own kind. If extortioners evolve in one of two sepa-
rate populations, they will not have to interact with co-players of their own kind.
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Nevertheless, their success may be short-lived, since they will be tempted to adopt
the even more proﬁtableAllD-strategy as a reaction to theAllC co-players which
they have produced, which in turns leads to the disappearance of theAllC-players.
Extortioners can only achieve a lasting (rather than short-lived) success if the
rate of adaptation for the host population is much slower than that for the sym-
bionts. To elucidate this point, we extend our previous analysis by revisiting a
co-evolutionary model of Damore and Gore (32). These authors consider host-
symbiont interactions where each host interacts with its own subpopulation of
endosymbionts. Let us assume that these interactions are given by an IPD game.
Members of both species reproduce with a probability proportional to their ﬁtness
(which is an increasing function of their payoffs), by replacing a randomly chosen
organism of their species. However, the two populations of hosts and symbionts
may evolve on different time scales, as measured by their relative evolutionary
rate (RER). For a relative evolutionary rate of one, hosts and symbionts evolve
at a similar pace in the evolutionary arms race, and no population is able to extort
the other (Fig. 5A). This changes drastically as soon as we increase the relative
evolutionary rate, by allowing symbionts to adapt more quickly. Fast adaptation
results in a short-term increase of the symbionts’ payoffs, since they can quickly
adjust to their respective host. In the long term, however, this induces hosts to
adopt extortion strategies (Fig. 5B), thereby forcing their symbionts to cooperate.
Thus it pays in the long run, for the host, to be slow to evolve; for the parameters
in Fig. 5B, the resulting equilibrium allocates them on average a surplus more
than ten times larger than the surplus achieved by the symbionts.
Discussion
Our main results show that within one population, extortion strategies can act as
catalyzers for cooperation, but prevail only if the population size is very small;
and that in interactions between two populations, extortion can emerge if the rates
of evolution differ. This holds not only for the donation game (and therefore
whenever R + P = T + S), but in considerably more general contexts. In the
last part of the SI, we emphasize this robustness. We could also assume that the
players alternate their moves in the donation game (30, 31); or that the underlying
PD game is asymmetric (the deﬁnitions have to be modiﬁed in an straightforward
way). As noted in (14), some results hold also for non-PD games; this deserves
further investigation.
In orthodox game theory, strategy A dominates B if no matter what the co-
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player does, A yields at least the payoff of B. When Press and Dyson (14) argue
that extortioners dominate their co-players, they mean that no matter what the co-
player does, the extortioner gets more. This is not quite the same, and we display
in section 2 of the SI an example which highlights the difference. Adami and
Hintze (16) stress a similar point in their title: ’Winning isn’t everything’. More-
over, when Press and Dyson speak of evolutionary players, they refer to players
who adapt their strategy in the course of an IPD-game; whereas in evolutionary
game theory, it is the population that evolves. Thus Press and Dyson analyzed
ZD strategies in the context of classical game theory, with two players locked in
contest: extortion strategies play an important role in this context, as do the more
orthodox trigger strategies, see (3, 9). In the context of evolutionary game theory,
whole populations are engaged in the game. For very small population size ex-
tortion strategies still offer good prospects. This is not surprising, as the limiting
case, a population size M = 2, reduces to the scenario analyzed by Press and
Dyson (14). In larger populations (with our parameter values, for M > 10), the
outcome is different. However, evolutionary game theory can reﬂect features of
classical game theory if the two interacting players game belong to two separate
evolving populations.
Extortion strategies are only a small subset of ZD-strategies. We have seen
that within large populations, the class of ZD strategies is not favored by se-
lection, in the sense that its neighborhood is not visited dis-proportionally often.
This does not preclude, of course, that certain elements of their class are favored
by selection. Thus Generous TFT (1, 1− c/b, 1, 1− c/b) does well. So do other,
less known strategies. In particular, Stewart and Plotkin highlighted a class of
strategies deﬁned, instead of Eq. [3], by PI − R = χ(PII − R) (with χ > 1)).
A player using this strategy does not claim a larger portion of the ’surplus’, but
a larger share of the ’loss’ (relative to the outcome R of full cooperation). Re-
markably, these ’compliant’ strategies do as well as WSLS. They are the only
ZD-strategies that are best replies against themselves.
In Adami and Hintze (16), the evolutionary stability of several ZD strategies
was tested by replicator dynamics and agent-based simulations, which indepen-
dently conﬁrms the result that these strategies do not prevail in large populations.
They used a population sizeM = 1024, and payoff values R = 3, S = 0, T = 5
and P = 1, i.e., a Prisoner’s Dilemma game which cannot be reduced to a dona-
tion game. Adami and Hintze also discuss the evolutionary success of ’tag-based’
strategies, which use extortion only against those opponents who do not share their
tag. These strategies are not memory-one strategies, since they depend not only
on the previous move; rather, they use memory-one strategies in speciﬁc contexts,
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which depend on the tag. Such a tag is an additional trait, which has to evolve and
risks being faked. When we consider interactions between different populations,
a cheater-proof tag is provided for free.
Therefore, extortion may evolve in endosymbiotic relationships due to the so-
called Red-King effect (18, 33, 34): the species that evolves at a slower rate gains
a disproportionate share of the beneﬁts. This requires two conditions to be met:
individuals need to come from different populations, and these populations have
to evolve on different time scales. If these conditions are fulﬁlled, extortioner
hosts can manipulate their symbionts’ evolutionary landscape in such a way that
the host’s and the symbionts’ payoffs are perfectly correlated. This ensures that
only those symbiont mutants can succeed that are beneﬁcial for the host. In this
sense, such hosts apply an evolutionary kind of mechanism design; they create an
environment that makes the symbionts’ cooperation proﬁtable for the symbionts,
but even more proﬁtable for themselves.
Appendix A: Proof of Eq. [2] Let us denote by PI(n) and PII(n) the play-
ers’ payoffs in round n, by si(n) the probability that I experiences outcome
i ∈ {R, S, T, P} in that round and by qi(n) the conditional probability, given
outcome i, that II plays C in round n + 1. By conditioning on round n, we see
that sR(n+ 1) is given by
sR(n)qR(n)pR + sS(n)qS(n)pS + sT (n)qT (n)pT + sP (n)qP (n)pP ,
and sS(n+ 1) by
sR(n)(1−qR(n))pR+sS(n)(1−qS(n))pS+sT (n)(1−qT (n))pT+sP (n)(1−qP (n))pP .
Hence the probability that I plays C in round n + 1, i.e., pC(n + 1) = sR(n +
1) + sS(n + 1), is given by s(n) · p = s(n) · [αgI + βgII + γ1 + g0, where
gI := (R, S, T, P ), gII := (R, T, S, P ), 1 = (1, 1, 1, 1) and g0 = (1, 1, 0, 0).
Thus w(n) := pC(n+ 1)− pC(n) is given by
αs(n) · gI + βs(n) · gII + γs(n) · 1
which is just αPI(n)+βPII(n)+ γ. Summing w(n) over n = 0, 1, ..., N − 1 and
dividing by N , we obtain
pC(N)− pC(0)
N
→ αPI + βPII + γ
and hence Eq. [2] holds, independently of the strategy of player II . The same
proof works for any 2 × 2 game (even if it is asymmetric: one just has to replace
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gII with the corresponding payoff vector). In many cases, however, there will be
no solutions to Eq. [1] which are feasible (i.e., probabilities between 0 and 1).
Appendix B: the sets ZD, EQ and EX : Elementary algebra shows that
within the four-dimensional unit cube of all memory-one strategies (pR, pS, pT , pP ),
the ZD-strategies are characterized by
(1− pR)(S + T − 2P ) + (1− pS)(P −R) + pT (R−P ) + pP (S + T − 2R) = 0,
(a three dimensional subset of the cube). Equalizers are characterized, in addition,
by
(R− P )(pS − pT − 1) = (T − S)(pR − pP − 1),
(they form a two-dimensional set) and χ-extortion strategies by pP = 0 and
pT [P − S + (T − P )χ] = (1− pS)[T − P + (P − S)χ],
(for each χ a one-dimensional set). In the special case of the donation game, these
equations reduce to
pR + pP = pS + pT ,
(b− c)(pS − pT − 1) = (b+ c)(pR − pP − 1),
pT (c+ χb) = (1− pS)(b+ χc),
respectively. The set EQ of equalizers is spanned by (1, 1, 0, 0), (c/b, 0, c/b, 0),
( 2c
b+c
, 0, 1, b−c
b+c
) and (1, 1 − c/b, 1, 1 − c/b), the set EX of extortion strategies by
(1, 1, 0, 0), (c/b, 0, c/b, 0) and (1, 0, 1, 0). All reactive strategies areZD-strategies,
the reactive equalizers are those satisfying p − q = c/b, and the reactive χ-
extortioners those with q = 0 and p = (b+ χc)/(c+ χb) (see Fig. 2).
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Figure 1: The payoffs PI and PII of players I and II if both players use memory-
one strategies in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (with T = 3, R = 2, P = 0
and S = −1). In each graph, the strategy of player I is ﬁxed to some p, whereas
the strategy q of the co-player II can vary, sampling the four-dimensional cube of
memory-one strategies (the blue dots correspond to 104 different realizations of q).
(A) In general, the payoff-pairs of the two players cover a two-dimensional area,
as here, when player I applies the strategy of win-stay lose-shift, i.e., pR = pP = 1
and pS = pT = 0. (B) However, if player I adopts a zero-determinant strategy,
then the possible payoff-pairs are restricted to a line. Two special classes of zero-
determinant strategies were highlighted by Press and Dyson (14): (C) Equalizers,
i.e., strategies that set the co-player’s score to a ﬁxed value (the line of payoffs has
slope zero), and (D) Extortioners, strategies which guarantee that the surplus of
player I is the χ-fold of the surplus of player II , i.e., PI −P = χ(PII −P ), with
χ > 1 (the line of payoffs has a positive slope, and intersects the diagonal at P ).
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Figure 2: Reactive strategies (pR = pT = p, pS = pP = q) for the donation game.
All reactive strategies (the square 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1) are ZD strategies. The equalizer
strategies are those on the segment between ’generous TFT ’ (p = 1, q = 1− c/b,
(20)) and ’Miser’ (p = c/b, q = 0, (31)), the extortion strategies those between
’Miser’ and TFT (p = 1, q = 0), and the ’compliant’ strategies (see (15) and
Discussion) those between ’generous TFT ’ and TFT .
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Figure 3: Evolutionary competition between some important strategies in the
IPD. For various population sizes M , the graphs show the frequency of each
strategy in the mutation-selection equilibrium. We consider two mutation regimes,
the limit of rare mutations µ→ 0 (top row), for which the equilibrium can be cal-
culated analytically, using (26) and a regime with mutation rate µ = 0.05 (bottom
row) which is explored by individual-based simulations. For the copying process,
we assume that individuals A and B are chosen randomly. A switches to B’s
strategy with a probability given by (1 + exp[s(PA − PB)])
−1, where PA and PB
are the corresponding payoff values and s ≥ 0 corresponds to ’selection strength’,
cf. (26). If AllD competes with WSLS the population is mostly in the defec-
tor’s state, independently of population size and the mutation rate (A). However,
once Eχ or TFT is added, WSLS succeeds if populations are sufﬁciently large
(B and C). TFT works slightly better than Eχ. Adding AllC only leads to minor
changes in the stationary distribution, which now slightly favour Eχ (D and E).
Parameters: b = 3, c = 1, s = 1, and χ = 2.
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Figure 4: Statistics of the evolutionary dynamics for memory-one strategies for
a range of different population sizes. We have calculated (A) the relative abun-
dance of extortioners, equalizers, and ZD strategies, i.e. the time spent in a δ-
neighborhood, divided by the volume of the intersection of that neighborhood with
the set of memory-one strategies; (B) the average strategy of the population; (C)
the average payoff. Extortioners, equalizers and ZD-strategies are only favored
for small population sizes. As the population size increases, individuals tend to
apply WSLS-like strategies, and to cooperate only after mutual cooperation or
mutual defection. As a result, the average payoff increases with population size.
For the simulations, 107 mutant strategies were randomly drawn from the space
of memory-one strategies. As in (25), the switch from a monomorphic population
using strategy X to a monomorphic population using strategy Y occured with
the probability of ﬁxation of a single Y mutant in a population of X-residents.
Parameters: b = 3, c = 1, δ = 0.1 and s = 100.
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Figure 5: Evolution of extortion in host-symbiont interactions. The graphs show
two typical simulation runs for a population of 40 hosts, each having a subpopula-
tion of 20 symbionts. For each simulation run, the upper graph shows the average
payoff for each population, whereas the lower graph shows the Euclidean distance
of each population to the set of extortioners (which can be at most 1.5275). In the
initial population all individuals cooperate unconditionally. The further evolu-
tion depends on the relative evolutionary rate (RER): (A) If RER = 1, both
species converge towards AllD, and no population is able to extort the other. (B)
For RER = 200, symbionts evolve much more quickly. In the short term, they
can thus increase their average payoff by switching to a non-cooperative strategy.
However, in the long term hosts apply extortion strategies to force their symbionts
to cooperate. Eventually, the hosts’ payoff exceeds b− c, whereas the symbionts’
payoff is close to zero. To model the evolutionary process, we followed (32):
Whenever a symbiont reproduces, its offspring remains associated with the same
host. Whenever the host reproduces, the new host offspring acquires its sym-
bionts from other hosts (horizontal transmission). Mutations occur with probabil-
ity µ = 0.05, by adding Gaussian noise to the memory-one strategy of the parent
(σ = 0.05). The process is run for 2, 000 host generations (corresponding to more
than 106 reproduction events for RER = 1, and more than 3 × 108 reproduction
events for RER = 200). The other parameters were b = 3, c = 1 and s = 10.
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